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Current theoretical and empirical research suggests that small banks have a comparative 
advantage in processing soft information and delivering relationship lending. The most 
comprehensive analysis of this view found using U.S. data that smaller SMEs borrow from smaller 
banks and smaller banks have stronger relationships with their borrowers (Berger, Miller, Petersen, 
Rajan, and Stein 2005) (BMPRS).    We employ essentially the same methodology as BMPRS on a 
unique Japanese data set but our findings are different in interesting ways.  Like BMPRS we find 
that more opaque firms are more likely to borrow from small banks.  Unlike BMPRS, however, 
our methodology allows us to attribute this to the ability of large banks to deliver financial 
statement lending.    Finally, quite unlike BMPRS we do not, on balance, find that small banks have 
stronger relationships with their SMEs.  We offer some speculation on potential explanations for 
these differences.  One possibility is that the credit culture and deployment of SME lending 
technologies differ in Japan from the U.S.  However, we note that strong conclusions cannot be 
reached without more research. 
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There is a general perception in Japan that competition across different types of banks has 
intensified in the past two decades.  It has been reported in the financial press that large banks 
have encroached on the markets that were once the domain of small banks such as Shinkin banks 
and credit cooperatives.
1  Large banks have created and introduced new loan products, such as 
loans collateralized by inventory, non-tangible assets, and accounts receivables, that have been 
specifically targeted to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
2  At the same time the 
number of small banks in market has been contracting due to bank failures and consolidation.
3  
As in other developed economies, these trends raise significant policy questions: Will small banks 
survive in the future in Japan?    If they do not, will some markets become underserved? 
Recent academic research suggests that small banks may have an advantage over large banks 
in providing credit to SMEs.    Specifically, this research suggests that large banks and small banks 
may have different comparative advantages in utilizing different lending technologies.    On the one 
hand, large banks are viewed as having a comparative advantage in underwriting SME loans using 
transaction-based lending technologies that rely on quantitative and transferable information called 
hard information, since they can enjoy scale economies in evaluating such information.  On the 
other hand, small banks are considered to have a comparative advantage in underwriting SME loans 
                                                  
1 A recent article for example reports that the uncollateralized and non-guaranteed “bargain-sale loans” 
of large bank which aim to capture blue-chip SMEs are threatening regional financial institutions 
(“Ootegin Kousei de Shuueki Kibisiku (Large banks threaten small banks’ profits),” the Nikkei 
Newspaper, January 20, 2004).  Another article reports that in response to this, regional financial 
institutions are increasing uncollateralized loans to SMEs (“Chigin, Shinkin, Mutanpo Yuushi wo 
Kakudai (Regional banks and Shinkin banks are expanding uncollateralized loans),” the Nikkei 
Newspaper, August 2, 2005). 
2 See, for example, “Ginko yu-shi ni kawaridane tanpo: chu-sho torihikisaki kaitaku ni chie (unusual 
collateral for bank loans: beat brains to develop new SME customers),” (Nikkei Newspaper, January 23, 
2006). 
3 Yamori (2005) reports the drastic decrease in the number of two types of cooperative banks in Japan: 
The number of Shinkin banks decreased from 462 in 1980 to 301 in 2005 and that of credit cooperatives 
decreased from 483 in 1980s to 179 in 2005. 
3  
utilizing the relationship lending technology, which relies primarily on qualitative non-transferable 
information called soft information.
4   Stein (2002) shows that small banks with simple 
organizational structures have comparative advantages in producing soft information and thereby 
excel at providing relationship lending.  A number of papers have found empirical evidence 
consistent with this theory particularly in the U.S. context (e.g., Cole, Goldberg and White 2004, 
Scott 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein 2005). 
The primary aim of this paper is to investigate whether small banks have this advantage in 
Japan and, more broadly, what this implies for the future of small banks in the Japanese context.  
Our methodological approach borrows extensively from Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 
(2005) (hereafter BMPRS), who found that bank-SME relationships are stronger for smaller banks 
than for larger banks.  Specifically, we apply the BMPRS empirical methodology to investigate 
whether strength of the bank-SME relationship differs by bank size using a unique data set of 
Japanese SMEs.  We are thus able to examine whether the findings of BMPRS and other 
U.S.-focused studies translate across country borders. 
Our analysis, however, is not just a replication of BMPRS using a data set in Japan.    Our data 
allow us to pursue the issue of bank size and bank-borrower relationships in more depth on one 
important dimension: information verifiability.    Specifically, unlike data used in U.S. studies such 
as BMPRS, our data allow us to identify whether an SME has audited financial statements.  The 
availability of audited financial statements determines whether an SME can receive loans based on 
what may be one of the most important transactions-based lending technologies that are alternatives 
to relationship lending: financial statement lending.  Our data on information verifiability allows 
us to extend the BMPRS analysis by investigating whether the importance of relationship strength 
                                                  
4 After the seminal works by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), enormous effort 
has been exerted to investigate whether a strong relationship between a bank and an SME brings about 
benefits, such as a lower interest rate and greater credit availability.  See Boot (2000), Ongena and 
Smith (2000), and Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004), for survey. 
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and bank size depends on the availability of audited financial statements.    That is, unlike BMPRS 
we can investigate whether bank size and relationship strength matters to financial statement 
borrowers. 
This extension is important because it allows econometrically for the possibility that large 
banks may underwrite SME loans using both the relationship lending technology and the financial 
statement lending technology.  If large banks can use both technologies, and if small banks are 
limited to using relationship lending, then there may be a bias against finding that large banks 
utilize (and are capable of utilizing) relationship lending if the data cannot distinguish between 
relationship lending and financial statement lending (Berger and Udell 2006).  This is effectively 
a bias against rejecting the Stein (2002) model.  Thus, a finding (as in BMPRS) that small banks 
have stronger relationships with their customers than large banks may not necessarily indicate that 
large banks are at a comparative disadvantage in doing relationship lending.  It could, instead, 
mean that large banks can do both relationship lending and financial statement lending while small 
banks can only do the former.  For relationship borrowers of large banks, relationship strength is 
important.  For their financial statement borrowers, relationship strength may not be important.  
Thus, on average relationship strength would be less important for large banks -- but not because 
they are incapable of utilizing relationship lending.   
This alternative interpretation may have important policy implications.  Some research has 
suggested that consolidation is not likely to eliminate small banks because they have a unique 
advantage in providing relationship lending to SMEs (e.g., DeYoung, Hunter and Udell 2004, 
Carter, McNulty and Verbrugge 2004).  However, if large banks are as good as small banks in 
providing relationship lending, then small banks do not have a unique advantage and their future 
viability may be much more tenuous.    We can test for this possibility as well. 
By way of preview our findings are quite different from BMPRS in interesting ways.  Like 
5  
BMPRS we find that more opaque firms are more likely to borrow from small banks.  Unlike 
BMPRS, however, our methodology allows us to attribute this finding to the ability of large banks 
to deliver financial statement lending.  Finally, quite unlike BMPRS we do not, on balance, find 
that small banks have stronger relationships with their SMEs.    This holds for most of our measures 
of relationship strength but not all.     
We view that our paper makes two main contributions.  First, by conducting a cross-country 
comparison of the largest and second largest economies we offer some insight as to whether 
differences in credit culture affect market conduct.  Our results suggest that they do.  In our 
conclusion we offer some speculation as to why.  Second, we offer a significant methodological 
improvement over other studies of SME credit including BMPRS in that we specifically consider 
the importance of the availability of verifiable information in the form of audited financial 
statements.  This innovation allows to draw the conclusion above that large banks may have an 
advantage delivering financial statement lending.    This methodological improvement has also been 
employed in a companion paper in a different context (Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe 2006), 
where it was used to investigate whether the benefits of strong bank-firm relationships are affected 
by information verifiability, bank complexity, and bank competition.     
The remaining part of this paper is composed as follows.  In the next section, we briefly 
explain some institutional background of small banks in Japan.    In Section 3, we introduce the data 
and methodology.  Section 4 presents the results and their interpretations.  The final section 
concludes the paper with policy implications. 
 
2. Institutional background 
The financial services industry in Japan has been segregated since World War II.    Within the 
commercial banking industry, one form of segregation has affected the delivery of large business 
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loans and loans to SMEs.    On the one hand, Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives, which are both 
cooperative banks, are mandated by law to confine their commercial lending to SMEs.  On the 
other hand, regional banks and city banks, which are bigger and operate under a different set of 
regulations (the Banking Act), have historically focused on bigger businesses, although they had not 
been prohibited from carrying on business with SMEs.
5   
The primary aim of this segregation appears to have been to promote expertise from 
specialization and to limit competition in order to guarantee profits and to secure the safety and 
soundness of the financial sector as a whole.  Due to this segregation, practitioners sometimes 
refer to the existence of a “banking ladder” from a firms’ point of view, which begins with small 
credit cooperatives, progress to a Shinkin bank, then to second-tier regional banks, to regional 
banks, and finally reaches to the largest city banks.  As firms grow, they step up this banking 
ladder and gain in reputation.  Practitioners sometimes use the term “sotsugyo (graduate)” in 
describing when a firm transfers from a lower-ladder bank to an upper-ladder bank.
6
This once clear segregation appears to be collapsing today, however.    As we mentioned in the 
introduction, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence that indicates that the customer base of 
different types of banks began to overlap.  In the 1980s, well-performing large and established 
firms stopped relying on commercial banks for fund-raising and turned to the capital markets.
7  
Large banks who lost their large business customers turned their focus in response to “blue-chip” 
SMEs and individuals.  As a result, commercial banks (especially large banks) dramatically 
                                                  
5 Until 1989, another type of bank, the Sogo banks (mutual banks), also existed and operated SME 
lending.    In 1989, all but one Sogo banks transformed their types and became banks under the Banking 
Act.    These banks are called second-tier regional banks. 
6 In principle, Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives are allowed to lend to their members only, which 
also contributes for SMEs to “sotsugyo.”  To become a member of a Shinkin bank, a firm has to have 
employees smaller than 300 persons or has capitalization smaller than 900 million yen.  Credit 
cooperatives have tighter restrictions so that further small firms can only qualify them. 
7 Financial liberalization and the development of the capital market also contributed to this flight from 
bank loans.    See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, chapter 7). 
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increased their loans to SMEs and individuals during this period (see Hoshi and Kashyap 2001, 
Chapter 8).  There are many recent newspaper articles that report that larger banks have targeted 
and attracted smaller borrowers that used to be the customers of small credit cooperatives or 
Shinkin banks.
8  The introduction of new loan products appears to have been part of this large 
bank strategy of targeting SMEs. 
Despite these reports of large bank entry into the SME market, recent data show that the 
duration of the relationship between SMEs and banks in Japan is still so long that firms rarely 
experience a change in main banks.
9 One possible reconciliation of these seemingly inconsistent 
pieces of evidence is that the role of small banks as the main bank is still irreplaceable and large 
banks have not become primary lenders to SMEs.  Instead, large banks have become secondary 
lenders – or what practitioners call “jun-mein (quasi-main)” or “hi-mein (non-main)” banks.    Thus, 
although large banks have quantitatively increased their SME lending, this does not necessarily 
mean that they have qualitatively superseded small banks and deprived of their role as “true” main 
banks. 
In summary, anecdotal evidence gives us a mixed view about the future of small banks in 
Japan.  To shed some light on these issues, we now turn to our formal empirical analysis of the 
role of small banks. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our data set is the same as that of Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe 2006.    This SME data 
is from the 2002 Survey of the Financial Environment (SFE survey) which was conducted by the 
                                                  
8 Interviews with bankers from small banks support this view. 
9 Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006) report that the average duration is 32.2 years.  See SME 
Agency (2002, 2003, 2004) as well for a long relationship in Japan. 
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SME Agency of the Government of Japan in November 2002.  It contains detailed information 
about the SMEs’ qualitative characteristics, their financial statements, and their relationships with 
their main bank.  The main bank is identified by a question in the survey which directly asks the 
firm to identify its main bank. 
We link the SFE survey data to data on the SMEs’ main banks using two different sources.  
For SMEs whose banks are city and regional banks, we obtain data on their banks from the Nikkei 
NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.).  For SMEs whose banks are 
Shinkin banks we obtain data on their banks from the Financial Statement of Shinkin Banks 
(Kin-yu Tosho Consultant Corporation).  Due to the small number of observations, we excluded 
sample firms for which the main bank is a credit cooperative or is not otherwise a city bank, 
regional bank or Shinkin bank.   
Firms in our sample are on average 47.33 years old, have assets of 3,424 million yen, and 
employ 103 people.  Average firms are therefore medium-sized firms.  The distribution of the 
sample firms by industry is: 36% for Manufacturing, 22% for Construction, 15% for Wholesale, 8% 
for Services, 6% for Retail, 3% for Transportation, 3% for Real estate, and 6% for other industries.   
For 25.4% of the sample firms, its main bank is a city bank; for 63.4% of the sample firms, a 
regional bank is its main bank; and for the remaining sample firms, a Shinkin bank is its main bank.
     
Below we explain our methodology and the variables used in the analysis. Summary statistics 
of the variables are found in Table A1.
10
 
3.2 Variables and methodology 
3.2.1    Determinants of bank size  
Hypothesis and main variables 
                                                  
10 For more detailed description of the data, see Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe 2006. 
9  
In our first set of tests we ask: “What size of bank do SMEs choose to borrow from?”  Our 
methodology here borrows extensively from BMPRS.  If, as Stein (2002) predicts, small banks 
have comparative advantages in producing soft information and large banks have comparative 
advantages in lending based on hard information, opaque firms would borrow from small banks and 
transparent firms would go to large banks.
11    Our testable hypothesis follows from this prediction: 
Transparent firms borrow from large banks and opaque firms borrow from small banks.   
The dependent variable in our regressions is bank size as measured by the natural logarithm of 
bank assets, log(BTASSET).  The main independent variable is the dummy variable AUDIT, 
which equals one if an SME has audited financial statements.  This variable indicates whether 
there is hard information about the firm’s performance and condition.  This hard information 
contained in audited financial statements would make the firm transparent and enable the bank to 
underwrite loans utilizing the financial statement lending (Berger and Udell 2006).  Thus,  our  first 
hypothesis predicts that AUDIT should have a significantly positive effect on log(BTASSET).  
That is, SMEs that have audited financial statements should choose larger banks that have a 
comparative advantage in providing financial statement loans because these loans are based on hard 
information. 
It is worthwhile noting that BMPRS do not have information on whether the firm’s financial 
statements are audited.  One of their proxies for hard information is firm asset size.  Their 
justification for this proxy is based on a presumption that large firms are more likely to have 
verifiable information than small firms are.    We do not have to rely on this assumption because our 
variable AUDIT directly and precisely captures the availability of the hard information associated 
                                                  
11 Subsequent research has suggested that the mapping implicit in Stein (2002) and other theoretical 
work between hard information and large firm lending may be overly simplistic. Some 
transactions-based (i.e., hard information-based) technologies may be well-suited for opaque borrowers 
such as factoring, leasing and small business credit scoring (Berger and Udell 2006).    For a discussion 
of this in the Japanese context see Uchida, Udell and Yamori (2006a).    In our analysis we focus on one 
type of hard information: audited financial statements. 
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with financial statement lending.  For comparability with BMPRS and to control for hard 
information which is unrelated to financial statement lending, we include as an independent variable 
log(ASSET), the natural logarithm of the firm’s asset, in addition to AUDIT. 
In addition to firm size, BMPRS also uses a dummy variable called Records, representing the 
existence of any sources of financial information, to proxy hard information.    This is, however, not 
a very good proxy for the quality (informativeness) of financial information: it does not contain 
information about whether this information is in the form of financial statements, whether the 
financial statements (if there are financial statements) were constructed based on GAAP or whether 
they were constructed by an independent CPA without verification (i.e., without audit) – much less 
whether it was verified by the third party in the form of an audit.  Critical for analysis is 
information about the existence of verifiable information about the firm’s condition and 
performance in the form of an audit.  Without this information, BMPRS cannot distinguish 
between relationship lending and financial statement lending.     
 
Control variables 
We also use a variety of different control variables.
12  From the firm’s financial statements 
we use current ratio, CURRENT, capital asset ratio, CAPRATIO, and pretax profit margin, 
PPMARGIN, are calculated and used.    FAGE is the age of the firm, EMPLOYEE is the number of 
employees, LISTED is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the firm is listed, and a 
dummy variable OWNER takes a value of one if the entrepreneur of the firm owns more than half 
shares of the firm.  We also use PROPERTY, BUILDING, MACHINERY, VEHICLE, TOOL, 
and LAND, which represent the fraction of tangible assets in total assets.  These variables 
represent the potential to pledge fixed assets as collateral.    Opaque or not, small firms with a high 
                                                  
12 See Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006) for more detailed explanation for these variables. 
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fraction of these assets may not have to rely on small banks, since even large banks can easily lend 
based on values of these assets as collateral.
13  
Entrepreneur characteristics are captured by a dummy variable GENDER, which takes a value 
of one if the entrepreneur is male, a dummy variable HOUSING, which takes a value of one if the 
entrepreneur has his/her own house, a dummy variable EDUCATION, which represents the 
entrepreneur’s education level, and AGE, the entrepreneur’s age.
14  We also use seven industry 
dummies, CONSTRUCT, TRANSPORT, WHOLESALE, RETAIL, REALESTATE, SERVICE, 
and OTHER, and eight regional dummies, HOKKAIDO, KITAKANTO, CHUBU, KANSAI, 
CHUGOKU, SHIKOKU, and KYUSHU.    The default is a manufacturing firm in Tokyo area. 
 
3.2.2 Strength of bank relationships 
Hypothesis and dependent variables 
We then investigate whether bank size matters in determining the strength of the bank-SME 
relationship.  Following BMPRS, we regress bank size as well as variety of control variables on 
proxies for strength.  The fundamental hypothesis we test is: smaller banks establish stronger 
relationships with SMEs than large banks do. 
As proxies for the strength of the bank-SME relationships, we take the following five 
alternative variables which are available from the SFE survey: (1) LENGTH, the length of the 
relationship between the firm and its main bank; (2) SCOPE, the variable representing the scope of 
relationships which is constructed by the principal component analysis using the information about 
the existence or non-existence of five particular transactions between the firm and the main bank; 
                                                  
13 Within the paradigm of lending technologies a la Berger and Udell (2006), banks could use alternative 
transactions-based lending technologies that are associated with these types of assets, i.e., leasing, 
equipment lending and real estate-based lending. 
14 The variable EDUCATION takes a value of one if the entrepreneur graduated a college, university, or 
graduate school. 
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(3) DISTANCE, a variable representing the physical distance between the firm and the bank 
branch; (4) CONTACT, a variable representing the frequency of contact between the firm and a 
loan officer of the main bank; and (5) NOBK, the number of banks that the firm is borrowing 
from.
15    Data Appendix contains detailed description of how to construct these variables.     
Using these five variables, we test our second hypothesis in five different ways.  That is, we 
test whether small banks are likely to (1) have longer SME relationships (a higher value of 
LENTGH), (2) have relationships with more scope (a higher value of SCOPE), (3) be located closer   
to their SMEs (a smaller value of DISTANCE),  (4) contact their SMEs more frequently (a larger 
value of CONTACT), (5) lend more exclusively (a smaller value of NOBK). 
In this paper we focus on the factors that determine the strength of bank-firm relationships, 
through which a bank accumulates soft information.  Of course, according to the theory of 
relationship lending, the strength of the relationship ultimately determines the availability and price 
of credit, i.e., the benefits of the relationship.    Thus, we are focusing here in this paper on only the 
first of the two-stage process.    We focus on the second stage in a companion paper Kano, Uchida, 
Udell, and Watanabe 2006.
16
 
Main independent variables 
The main independent variable is bank size.    We take a natural logarithm of the variable and 
use log(BTASSET).  A finding of a negative coefficient on log(BTASSET) would be consistent 
with the theoretical argument that small banks have an advantage in relationship lending.  In 
                                                  
15 Alternative to NOBK, we also tried a dummy variable, EXCLUSIVE, which takes a value of one if the 
main bank is the sole lender to the firm.    It produced very poor results with few significant independent 
variables, and is thus not reported. 
16 We do not use Trade Credit Paid Late as a dependent variable in our analysis as BMPRS did for two 
reasons.    First, a comparable variable is not available from the survey data.    Second, because our focus 
in this paper is on the determinants of the strength of banking relationships (the first stage of the stage 
process), we do not examine the benefits of strong relationships (the second stage of the process) 
including the timing of trade credit payments. 
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addition, we use AUDIT and interact it with log(BTASSET).    This is to isolate firms that may not 
have to rely on strong relationships with banks, i.e., financial statement borrowers.    Banks may use 
alternatives to the relationship lending technology that do not rely on soft information, one of the 
most important being financial statement lending.  It has been argued in the literature that large 
banks can use the financial statement lending technology because it requires only hard information 
in the form of audited financial statements (Berger and Udell 2006).  This suggests that 
relationship would be stronger for borrowers other than financial statement  borrowers.  This  would 
imply a negative coefficient on AUDIT.    The cross term of log(BTASSET) and AUDIT allows for 
a differential affect on audit based on bank size.   
It has been argued that large banks have an advantage in processing hard information and a 
disadvantage in processing soft information -- and vice-versa for small banks (Stein 2002).  This 
implies that large banks will deliver financial statement lending but not relationship lending and 
vice-versa for small banks (Berger and Udell 2006).  Our methodology allows for all possibilities 
including those inconsistent with these propositions:  large banks could deliver either relationship 
lending or financial statement lending and small banks could deliver either relationship lending or 
financial statement lending.  This kind of analysis was not possible in BMPRS since they did not 
have a variable corresponding to AUDIT. 
 
Control variables 
As in BMPRS we include as controls a variety of bank characteristics other than bank size.
17  
BTLOANR is the loan to total asset ratio, BLIQUIDITY is the liquid asset to total asset ratio, 
BCAPR is the capital asset ratio, BBIS is the BIS capital asset ratio, and BROA_N is the net 
business profit to total asset ratio.  We also include three dummy variables: ACQUIRE indicates 
                                                  
17 Again, see Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006) for more details.   
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that a bank was involved in a merger as an acquirer, ACQUIRED indicates that a bank was acquired 
in a merger, and HELD indicates that the bank is a subsidiary of a bank holding company.  We 
also use two variables representing non-performing loans.  BNPL_RATE is a bad loan ratio, and 
BLOSS is a ratio of loan loss provision to total asset. 
 
4. Results and implications 
4.1    Determinants of Bank Size 
The results for the bank size regressions are shown in  Table  1.  Both  of our main independent 
variables, AUDIT and firms asset size are positive and significant, although AUDIT is only 
significant at the 10% level.  The positive coefficient on AUDIT indicates that firms with audited 
financial statements who can borrow under the financial statement lending, tend to borrow at larger 
banks.  The positive coefficient on firm size indicates that even after controlling for financial 
statement transparency, larger firms are more likely to borrow from large banks.  A similar size 
effect is also reflected in a positively significant coefficient of EMPLOYEE. 
The result on firm size is consistent with that of BMPRS in the US context.  However, the 
interpretation is different, since we also have AUDIT as an independent variable which BMPRS did 
not have.  We can interpret our results as (weakly) suggestive that firms whose loans can be 
underwritten using the financial statement lending technology (AUDIT) are more likely to borrow 
from larger banks.  Having controlled for transparency, we find a separate firm size effect 
(log(ASSET)) which is likely to be driven by many factors that are unrelated to firm transparency 
such as legal lending limit/portfolio diversification considerations and large firm product 
considerations.  Because BMPRS cannot disentangle the firm size effect from the 
transparency/audit effect, they could not draw this inference. 
Turning to the other independent variables, listed firms are more likely to borrow from large 
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banks.  This could also be interpreted as an indication that more transparency is associated with 
large banks, although this could also capture some nontransparency-driven factors related to size.  
More educated entrepreneurs are more likely to borrow from large banks, owner managed firms 
tend to borrow from a smaller bank, and firms in the transportation industry (TRANSPORT) tend to 
choose bigger banks.  We also note that there are some observed regional differences.   
Specifically, firms located in metropolitan areas (Tokyo (default) or Kansai) tend to borrow from 
larger banks. 
Finally, firms with higher proportion of fixed assets (BUILDING, MACHINERY, VEHICLE 
and LAND) tend to choose smaller banks.    The results on these fixed asset coefficients are slightly 
surprising.  Some research has argued that fixed asset lending (e.g., real-estate based lending and 
equipment based lending) should be viewed as separate lending technologies when these loans are 
primarily underwritten based on the appraised value of the assets (Berger and Udell 2006).    Given 
that these are transactions-based lending technologies, we would have expected them to be more 
frequently associated with larger banks a la Stein (2002).  However, it is difficult to draw strong 
conclusions here because it is possible that these assets were not used in the underwriting process or 
they were used only as a secondary source of repayment (back-up collateral) in a loan that was 
primarily underwritten using the relationship lending technology.  Without information about the 
terms of the loan contract, it is not possible to empirically distinguish among these alternative 
explanations.  
 
4.2  Strength  of  bank  relationships 
The results of the determinants of the strength of the bank-SME relationship are shown in 
Table 2 through Table 6.  These tables reflect regressions with differing dependent variables used 




Table 2 shows the regression with the length of the bank-borrower relationship, LENGTH, as 
the dependent variable.  We can see that LENGTH is not associated with bank asset size 
(BTASSET), AUDIT, or their cross-product.  This result on bank asset size is strikingly different 
from that in BMPRS and can be interpreted as inconsistent with theoretical predictions and 
empirical evidence that smaller banks have a comparative advantage in processing soft information 
and delivering relationship lending (e.g., Stein 2002, Carter, McNulty and Verbrugge 2004, Scott 
2004, Liberti and Mian 2006).     
It might alternatively, however, reflect some idiosyncratic differences between Japan and the 
U.S. that may dilute LENGTH as a proxy for relationship strength in the Japanese context.  
Banking relationships in Japan for example appear to be dramatically longer than in the U.S: the 
average banking relationship for an SME in our data for Japan is 32.2 years, while the relationship 
reported in BMPRS is only 8.7 years.    This suggests the possibility that frictions or other factors in 
the Japanese context might discourage switching banks that are unrelated to the production of soft 
information.
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Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006) suggest another possibility.   Using the same data 
set as that of the present paper, they report that a longer bank-borrower relationship leads to a lower 
loan interest rate only when a Shinkin (small) bank under intense competition lends to an unaudited 
SME.  Thus, if we interact AUDIT and some proxy for the degree of bank competition with 
BTASSET, we might find negatively significant effect.  In future revisions we plan to pursue this 
extension. 
 
                                                  
18 These differences or frictions could fall under the broad rubric of differences in the social environment.   
For a brief summary of the literature in this area see Berger and Udell (2006). 
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SCOPE 
Table 3 shows the regression with the scope of the bank-borrower relationship, SCOPE, as the 
dependent variable.    Similar to the case of the LENGTH regression, this table also shows that bank 
size and audited financial statements are not associated with the strength of the banking relationship 
in terms of its scope.    We cannot compare this result across countries since BMPRS do not have a 
corresponding dependent variable.  However, the result is in line with the loan interest rate 
regression of Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006), which reflects no association between 
SCOPE and the interest rate. 
 
DISTANCE 
When distance is used as our measure of strength we find some evidence that bank size matters.   
However, it matters in a way that is inconsistent with BMPRS and theoretical and empirical 
findings that small banks have a comparative advantage in relationship lending.  Specifically, 
Table 4 shows that a bigger bank tends to be located closer to their SME (the coefficient of 
log(BTASSET).  The effect is offset, however, for firms with audited financial statements whose 
loans may be underwritten using the financial statement lending technology (the coefficient of the 
cross term AUDIT*log(BTASSET).  On balance, DISTANCE is greater when a small bank lends 
than when a large bank lends, although this relationship is more powerful when the SME does not 
have audited financial statements. 
One plausible alternative interpretation of the bank size result that could reconcile the findings 
here with BMPRS is that DISTANCE may be affected by the size distribution of banks in SME 
markets.  In Japan, large banks tend to have many branch offices in city centers, whereas small 
banks are often spread out in the country side.  This could contribute to the difference in average 
physical distance across large and small banks.  To isolate this concentration factor, BMPRS use 
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several control variables to represent the geographical distribution of large banks and small banks.  
These same kinds of control variables will be introduced when we extend this analysis in future 
revisions of this paper.  
 
CONTACT 
Next, Table 5 shows our regression that uses frequency of contact as our measure of strength.  
The results show that a smaller bank has more frequent contact with a borrower, which is consistent 
with the US result.  Interestingly, small banks establish stronger relationships irrespective of the 
existence or non-existence of audited financial statements.  They frequently visit borrowers even 
when the SME has audited statements.  These results are, however, inconsistent with our results 
for DISTANCE.  Unlike our previous findings on DISTANCE, the results here on CONTACT 
imply that small banks try to establish stronger relationships with borrowers by having frequent 
contact.  Arguably frequency of contact is the better proxy for relationship closeness to the extent 
that the production of soft information comes from personal interaction with the borrower.  This 
argues that smaller banks develop stronger relationships with their SME customers and that they 
visit their SMEs more frequently than large banks to collect information in spite of their being 
located on average at a longer distance.  The seeming inconsistency of these two variables may 
also stem, as indicated above, from the DISTANCE result being biased by a geographical 
distribution of banks.  
 
NOBK 
Finally, in our last regression we use the number of banks (NOBK) as our measure of strength.   
In this regression (Table 6), log(BTASSET) is not significant while AUDIT is significant.    Turning 
first to the log(BTASSET) variable, the insignificance of the coefficient is inconsistent with the 
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findings in BMPRS (although the sign in our regression is consistent) and, again, more generally 
fails to support theoretical and empirical work that indicates that small banks should have stronger 
relationships with their borrowers given their ability to process soft information.     
With respect to AUDIT, a firm with audited financial statements is likely to borrow from a 
smaller number of banks.  As the coefficient of AUDIT*log(BTASSET) shows, however, the 
effect is diminished for larger banks.  Taken together, a firm with audited financial statements is 
likely to have stronger banking relationships in terms of the number of lending banks, although the 
effect is smaller if its main bank is large.     
The result on AUDIT is not comparable to findings in BMPRS because they do not have data 
on whether financial statements are audited.  More generally, however, this result is inconsistent 
with theoretical and empirical findings elsewhere on relationship lending versus transactions 
lending.  On the on hand, because relationship lending requires soft information, existing theory 
suggests that AUDIT=0 should be associated with stronger relationships.  On the other hand, 
because financial statement lending requires hard information (i.e., because financial statement 
lending is transactions-based), existing theory suggests that AUDIT=1 be associated with weaker 
relationships.    Our results on NOBK are inconsistent with these hypotheses. 
This result along with some of the other results above that are inconsistent with BMPRS cast 
some doubt on the nature and importance of relationship lending in the Japanese SME loan market.   
These findings would be consistent with the recent contention that Japanese banks are not 
particularly good at monitoring and screening borrowers, that they do not emphasize relationship 
lending, and may in fact be inferior relationship lenders to trade creditors (Miwa and Ramseyer 




In this paper we investigate the link between banking relationships and bank size in the 
Japanese SME commercial loan market.  Our methodological approach is very similar to Berger, 
Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) (BMPRS).  This allows to shed light on potential 
similarities and differences between commercial lending practices in the largest commercial 
markets in the world.  Our unique Japanese data set also allows to investigate some issues that 
BMPRS were unable to address because of limitations in their data. 
Recent theoretical and empirical work has drawn some clear distinctions between relationship 
lending and transactions lending.  A key distinction in the literature focuses on the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of large and small banks.  On balance this literature argues that 
larger banks because of their scale have an advantage in delivering transactions-based lending to 
SMEs because this type of lending involves processing hard information.  This literature also 
argues that small banks have an advantage in processing soft information because soft information 
depreciates as it is passed through the hierarchical structure of large banks.  In the only 
comprehensive test of the link between banks size and SME banking relationships, BMPRS found 
evidence consistent with this view in the U.S. context.  Specifically, they found evidence that 
transparent firms are more likely to borrow from large banks and smaller banks are more likely to 
have stronger relationships with their borrowers.    Moreover, their findings on the latter issue were 
quite robust to different specifications. 
On balance our findings are mostly inconsistent with the findings in BMPRS and more 
generally inconsistent with the view that small banks are at a comparative advantage in providing 
relationship lending.  In most of our tests of the association between bank size and relationship 
strength we did not find that smaller banks had stronger relationships although these tests were not 
entirely robust.  Specifically, we found that lending relationships were not longer nor was their 
scope greater for small banks.  Moreover, we found that banking relationships were no more 
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exclusive for small banks than large banks (unless the firm had audited financial statements), and 
that distance between SMEs and their banks was actually longer for small banks than large banks.  
Only when we measured relationship strength in terms of contact frequency did we find that smaller 
banks have stronger relationships with their SMEs 
However, consistent with BMPRS we found that larger firms were more likely to borrow from 
larger banks.  BMPRS interpret this result as evidence that more transparent firms migrate to 
larger banks.  While this interpretation of theirs is consistent with a transparency explanation, the 
positive association between firm size and banks size is also consistent with other explanations 
including bank diversification and legal limit explanations -- small banks avoid large commercial 
loans because they lead to undiversified loan portfolios.  We can avoid this problem because 
unlike BMPRS we include a dummy variable for whether the SME has audited financial statements, 
which both make the SME transparent and enable it to obtain transactions based financing in the 
form of financial statement lending.  Our results show that although large firms tend to borrow 
from large banks as BMPRS demonstrated, it is not only because large firms are financial statement 
borrowers.  We find that whether they are audited or not large firms borrow from large banks.  
We also find that irrespective of their size, audited firms are more likely to go to larger banks 
suggesting that larger banks are more likely to deliver financial statement lending.     
Thus, on the one hand, our results (from the first stage of the analysis) provide a stronger 
indication than BMPRS that large banks deliver financial statement lending.  However, on the 
other hand, our results (from the second stage of the analysis) do not reflect compelling evidence 
that small banks in Japan have stronger relationships.    There are several possible interpretations of 
this.  First, our results could simply be viewed as contradicting the theoretical prediction and 
empirical findings in other countries that large banks are disadvantaged in providing relationship 
lending.  This interpretation has an important policy implication.  It would suggest that concerns 
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about the disappearance of small banks through consolidation are misplaced.    If small banks do not 
have a unique ability to deliver relationship lending, then their disappearance ceteris paribus would 
not affect SME credit availability.     
Second, our variables may not be sufficiently powerful proxies in general for relationship 
strength.  The problem with this interpretation is that our variables are very close to the same 
variables used elsewhere, particularly BMPRS, and out findings are strikingly different from 
BMPRS.    As we note above there are some differences in our model structure from BMPRS which 
we intend to explore further.    Firmer conclusions await further investigation of these differences. 
Third, our results suggest the possibility that Japan may indeed be different than the U.S. in 
ways that would explain the differences in our results versus BMPRS.  This possibility clearly 
begs for more research on the Japanese SME loan market.  One potential explanation is that the 
Japanese and American credit cultures are quite different.  Possibly the relative deployment of 
lending technologies across these two markets and the distinctions among lending technologies may 
be quite different.    Possibly banks in Japan rely far more on fixed asset collateral, particularly real 
estate, than in the U.S.  To the extent that this displaces relationship lending, this could bias our 
analysis against finding a link between bank size and relationship strength if relationship strength 
only matters for the relatively small amount of non-real estate based loans.  This also dovetails 
with recent findings elsewhere that suggest that relationship lending may be limited in Japan.  
Taken together these recent papers contend that Japanese banks are not particularly good at 
monitoring and screening borrowers, that they do not emphasize relationship lending, and may in 
fact be inferior relationship lenders to trade creditors (Miwa and Ramseyer 2006, Uchida, Udell and 
Watanabe 2006, and Uchida, Udell and Yamori 2006b). 
Another possibility is that the social environment is substantially different in Japan and the U.S.   
If, for example, the level of social capital and trust is higher in Japan than in the U.S., this may 
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affect the writing and enforcement of financial contracts.  This importance of social capital in 
explaining regional or cross-country differences in financial contracting has been demonstrated in 
related contexts (Stulz and Williamson 2003, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004).  It could also 
make it easier in Japan to conduct relationship lending in the sense of requiring less production of 
soft information.  This in turn would lead to less emphasis on relationship strength.  This is 
clearly speculation on our part, however.    More research in this area is certainly needed. 
 
 




This variable represents how many years the firm and its main bank have transactional 
relationships.  The relevant question in the SFE survey considers the existence of not lending 
relationship only but broader relationships.   
2. SCOPE   
This variable is the first principal component of the principal component analysis over five 
dummy variables representing the existence or non-existence of a particular transaction between the 
firm and the main bank.    The five dummy variables are created based on the following five questions: 
(i) whether the SME has a checking account at the main bank, (ii) whether the SME settles notes 
payables at the main bank, (iii) whether the SME has recently purchased stock in its main bank, (iv) 
whether the SME has obtained some information services from the main bank, and (v) whether the SME 
has time deposits at the main bank.     
3. DISTANCE 
Since the original question in the SFE survey only gives us multi-nominal information, we 
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constructed DISTANCE as follows: It takes a value of 0.25 if the firm answered that the distance is no 
greater than 500m, 0.75 if the distance is greater than 500m and no greater than 1km, 5.5 if it is greater 
than 1km and no greater than 10km, 20 if it is greater than 10km and no greater than 30km, 40 if it is 
greater than 30km and no greater than 50km, and 75 if it is greater than 50km. 
4. CONTACT 
The original question in the SFE survey only asks firms to choose from nine categorical options. 
We thus constructed CONTACT as follows: It takes a value of 365 if the frequency of contact between 
the firm and the loan officer of the main bank is answered once a day, 52 if the frequency is once a week, 
26 if it is once in two weeks, 12 if it is once a month, 6 if it is once in two months, 4 if it is once in three 
months, 2 if it is once in a half year, 1 if it is once a year, and 0 if no contact has been made in the past 
one year. 
5. NOBK 
NOBK is the number of lender institutions including non-banks that a respondent firm borrows 
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27 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BTASSET (million yen) 1960 20100000 32300000 42824 102000000
ASSET (thondsand yen) 1960 3423718 6995780 2337 88000000
LENGTH䇭(year) 1960 32.196 15.770 1 99
SCOPE 1960 0.000 1.273 -4.450 1.625
NOBK 1960 3.165 3.818 0 99
DISTANCE 1889 6.144 9.661 0.250 75
CONTACT 1908 46.483 84.649 0 365
AUDIT 1960 0.588 0.492 0 1
CURRENT 1960 1.723 6.767 0.078 290.959
CAPRATIO 1960 0.257 0.290 -4.761 0.969
PPMARGIN 1960 0.010 0.087 -1.513 1.452
BUILDING 1960 0.107 0.119 -0.025 0.892
MACHINERY 1960 0.050 0.097 -0.046 0.775
VEHICLE 1960 0.009 0.034 -0.004 0.545
TOOL 1960 0.009 0.020 0.000 0.504
LAND 1960 0.136 0.127 0.000 0.842
FAGE (year) 1960 47.332 26.000 3 378
EMPLOYEE (person) 1960 103.200 447.529 2 17417
LISTED 1960 0.033 0.179 0 1
OWNER 1960 0.431 0.495 0 1
GENDER 1960 0.983 0.129 0 1
HOUSING 1960 0.891 0.312 0 1
EDUCATION 1960 0.619 0.486 0 1
AGE (year) 1960 59.084 9.415 29 95
CONSTRUCT 1960 0.222 0.416 0 1
TRANSPORT 1960 0.028 0.164 0 1
WHOLESALE 1960 0.154 0.361 0 1
RETAIL 1960 0.064 0.245 0 1
REALESTATE 1960 0.027 0.162 0 1
SERVICE 1960 0.081 0.273 0 1
OTHER 1960 0.063 0.243 0 1
HOKKAIDO 1960 0.082 0.275 0 1
TOHOKU 1960 0.126 0.332 0 1
KITAKANTO 1960 0.034 0.180 0 1
CHUBU 1960 0.232 0.422 0 1
KANSAI 1960 0.145 0.352 0 1
CHUGOKU 1960 0.078 0.268 0 1
SHIKOKU 1960 0.052 0.221 0 1
KYUSHU 1960 0.076 0.265 0 1
BTLOANR 1960 0.635 0.074 0.383 0.836
BLIQUIDITY 1960 0.300 0.068 0.140 0.616
BCAPR 1960 0.039 0.012 0.016 0.105
BBIS 1960 0.100 0.019 0.046 0.206
BROA N 1960 0.006 0.002 -0.005 0.015
ACQUIRE 1960 0.067 0.251 0 1
ACQUIRED 1960 0.134 0.340 0 1
HELD 1960 0.301 0.459 0 1
BNPL RATE 1960 0.055 0.021 0.012 0.151
BLOSS 1960 -0.022 0.037 -0.4434 -0.0009





Intercept Intercept 14.8132 *** 0.4373 0.000
AUDIT 0.5541 * 0.3248 0.088
log(ASSET) 0.1791 *** 0.0392 0.000
AUDIT*log(ASSET) -0.0635 0.0449 0.158
CURRENT -0.0016 0.0019 0.392
CAPRATIO 0.3234 ** 0.1321 0.014
PPMARGIN 0.0663 0.4015 0.869
BUILDING -0.5073 * 0.2593 0.051
MACHINERY -0.9752 *** 0.3228 0.003
VEHICLE -2.3070 ** 1.0737 0.032
TOOL -1.8677 1.2197 0.126
LAND -0.8758 *** 0.2607 0.001
FAGE 0.0014 0.0021 0.517
FAGE2 0.0000 0.0000 0.823
EMPLOYEE 0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.000
LISTED 0.5053 *** 0.1704 0.003
OWNER -0.2491 *** 0.0671 0.000
GENDER 0.1304 0.2325 0.575
HOUSING -0.1302 0.0969 0.179
EDUCATION 0.3965 *** 0.0694 0.000
AGE 0.0076 ** 0.0033 0.023
CONSTRUCT -0.1346 0.0851 0.114
TRANSPORT 0.4230 ** 0.2022 0.037
WHOLESALE 0.0617 0.0982 0.530
RETAIL -0.0125 0.1138 0.913
REALESTATE -0.3046 0.2188 0.164
SERVICE 0.0154 0.1216 0.899
OTHER 0.1966 0.1257 0.118
HOKKAIDO -1.9965 *** 0.1423 0.000
TOHOKU -2.2393 *** 0.1167 0.000
KITAKANTO -1.0308 *** 0.1634 0.000
CHUBU -1.4663 *** 0.1069 0.000
KANSAI -0.1374 0.1267 0.278
CHUGOKU -1.6643 *** 0.1278 0.000
SHIKOKU -1.4951 *** 0.1211 0.000
KYUSYU -1.8628 *** 0.1211 0.000
Number of observation 1960
F-value 41.5300
Prob (F value) 0.0000
R-squared 0.4091
Table 1.  Bank choice
(Dependent variable = ln(BTASSET))

















Intercept Intercept -5.6364 14.0489 0.688
AUDIT -3.0844 5.0015 0.538
log(BTASSET) -0.1181 0.4395 0.788
AUDIT*log(BTASSET) 0.1982 0.3258 0.543
log(ASSET) 0.9694 *** 0.2257 0.000
CURRENT -0.0973 *** 0.0194 0.000
CAPRATIO 2.8128 *** 0.8008 0.000
PPMARGIN -7.3633 *** 2.5128 0.003
BUILDING 0.5752 2.4421 0.814
MACHINERY -0.9613 2.4078 0.690
VEHICLE -0.8020 8.3448 0.923
TOOL -5.8956 13.2200 0.656
LAND 0.9983 2.0907 0.633
FAGE 0.5734 *** 0.0505 0.000
FAGE2 -0.0016 *** 0.0004 0.000
EMPLOYEE 0.0014 *** 0.0005 0.009
LISTED 1.8454 2.0525 0.369
OWNER -0.8179 0.5757 0.156
GENDER 1.7182 1.7527 0.327
HOUSING 1.5455 * 0.8833 0.080
EDUCATION 0.8117 0.5972 0.174
AGE 0.1168 *** 0.0306 0.000
CONSTRUCT -1.1052 0.7307 0.131
TRANSPORT -1.3011 1.8740 0.488
WHOLESALE 0.6055 0.8887 0.496
RETAIL -0.8914 1.2580 0.479
REALESTATE -1.6979 1.4555 0.244
SERVICE -2.2355 ** 0.9614 0.020
OTHER -1.6397 1.0956 0.135
HOKKAIDO 0.2009 1.3540 0.882
TOHOKU 3.1591 *** 1.1570 0.006
KITAKANTO 2.8819 ** 1.4156 0.042
CHUBU 2.1021 ** 0.9978 0.035
KANSAI 1.4011 1.0472 0.181
CHUGOKU 2.9136 ** 1.3135 0.027
SHIKOKU 3.2974 ** 1.4542 0.023
KYUSYU 3.5130 *** 1.2799 0.006
BTLOANR -2.6651 10.7340 0.804
BLIQUIDITY -4.4663 12.0983 0.712
BCAPR 105.4783 128.0528 0.410
BCAPR^2 -998.8306 1396.1310 0.474
BBIS -42.1557 44.4736 0.343
BBIS^2 390.8340 ** 170.3497 0.022
BROA N -122.2098 132.5798 0.357
ACQUIRE 0.7621 1.3458 0.571
ACQUIRED 0.9789 1.1820 0.408
HELD -2.3901 ** 1.1798 0.043
BNPL RATE 1.9431 17.9070 0.914
BLOSS 12.2044 7.7744 0.117
Number of observation 1960
F-value 30.2600
Prob (F value) 0.0000
R-squared 0.4638
Table 2.  Determinants of relationship closeness
(Dependent variable = LENGTH)



















Intercept Intercept -0.0751 1.3959 0.957
AUDIT 0.4315 0.4852 0.374
log(BTASSET) -0.0354 0.0439 0.421
AUDIT*log(BTASSET) -0.0242 0.0311 0.437
log(ASSET) 0.1469 *** 0.0224 0.000
CURRENT -0.0044 0.0056 0.438
CAPRATIO -0.0933 0.1708 0.585
PPMARGIN 0.4498 0.2783 0.106
BUILDING -0.5763 ** 0.2664 0.031
MACHINERY 0.5496 ** 0.3210 0.087
VEHICLE 0.1119 1.0411 0.914
TOOL -1.5640 1.1001 0.155
LAND 0.5786 ** 0.2359 0.014
FAGE 0.0222 *** 0.0027 0.000
FAGE2 -0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.000
EMPLOYEE -0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.006
LISTED -0.3846 ** 0.1622 0.018
OWNER 0.0890 0.0570 0.119
GENDER -0.0649 0.2057 0.752
HOUSING 0.0244 0.0824 0.767
EDUCATION -0.0999 0.0622 0.109
AGE -0.0020 0.0029 0.499
CONSTRUCT -0.0710 0.0746 0.341
TRANSPORT -0.5228 ** 0.2286 0.022
WHOLESALE -0.0619 0.0809 0.444
RETAIL -0.3680 *** 0.1049 0.000
REALESTATE -0.8279 *** 0.1886 0.000
SERVICE -0.5832 *** 0.1272 0.000
OTHER -0.5616 *** 0.1385 0.000
HOKKAIDO 0.2160 0.1483 0.146
TOHOKU 0.1357 0.1200 0.258
KITAKANTO -0.1612 0.1763 0.361
CHUBU 0.2180 ** 0.0931 0.019
KANSAI 0.1510 * 0.0910 0.097
CHUGOKU 0.1473 0.1250 0.239
SHIKOKU 0.1995 0.1319 0.131
KYUSYU 0.1907 0.1284 0.138
BTLOANR -0.1005 1.0565 0.924
BLIQUIDITY -0.4424 1.1945 0.711
BCAPR -9.3175 12.8111 0.467
BCAPR^2 124.9498 132.2739 0.345
BBIS -12.9192 *** 4.6664 0.006
BBIS^2 36.8953 ** 18.3708 0.045
BROA N 18.2607 14.6678 0.213
ACQUIRE 0.3737 *** 0.1193 0.002
ACQUIRED -0.0022 0.1122 0.984
HELD -0.0995 0.1246 0.425
BNPL RATE 1.1796 1.8340 0.520
BLOSS -0.1376 0.6941 0.843
Number of observation 1960
F-value 8.7900
Prob (F value) 0.0000
R-squared 0.1976
Table 3.  Determinants of relationship closeness
(Dependent variable = SCOPE)



















Intercept Intercept 33.6637 ** 14.4185 0.020
AUDIT -7.2610 4.4480 0.103
log(BTASSET) -0.7994 ** 0.3615 0.027
AUDIT*log(BTASSET) 0.5056 * 0.2960 0.088
log(ASSET) 0.4013 * 0.2215 0.070
CURRENT 0.1070 *** 0.0157 0.000
CAPRATIO -0.9732 0.7523 0.196
PPMARGIN -3.9901 3.1593 0.207
BUILDING 6.2531 ** 2.7255 0.022
MACHINERY 0.3900 2.0675 0.850
VEHICLE 0.5341 4.9740 0.915
TOOL 55.3563 *** 19.9018 0.005
LAND 1.4931 1.6363 0.362
FAGE -0.0226 0.0150 0.133
FAGE2 0.0000 0.0001 0.761
EMPLOYEE 0.0002 0.0007 0.772
LISTED 0.1372 1.9135 0.943
OWNER -0.7409 * 0.3963 0.062
GENDER -0.3249 1.3147 0.805
HOUSING 0.4092 0.7066 0.563
EDUCATION 0.2497 0.4357 0.567
AGE -0.0682 *** 0.0214 0.001
CONSTRUCT -2.4873 *** 0.5278 0.000
TRANSPORT -1.7277 1.6326 0.290
WHOLESALE -3.1979 *** 0.5409 0.000
RETAIL -4.3820 *** 0.6650 0.000
REALESTATE -2.3168 1.9176 0.227
SERVICE -3.4086 *** 0.8836 0.000
OTHER -3.0639 *** 1.1514 0.008
HOKKAIDO 0.3083 1.0110 0.760
TOHOKU 1.0848 0.9820 0.269
KITAKANTO 4.5136 * 2.3843 0.059
CHUBU 1.9020 * 1.0124 0.060
KANSAI 0.4731 0.8442 0.575
CHUGOKU 3.2911 ** 1.2692 0.010
SHIKOKU 2.3832 1.5806 0.132
KYUSYU 1.3314 0.9672 0.169
BTLOANR -18.9979 * 11.2163 0.090
BLIQUIDITY -20.5395 * 10.7826 0.057
BCAPR 62.0536 78.0154 0.426
BCAPR^2 -1241.9730 849.8758 0.144
BBIS 24.9664 36.4057 0.493
BBIS^2 53.0214 160.9945 0.742
BROA N 45.9319 86.8819 0.597
ACQUIRE 1.3633 1.2474 0.275
ACQUIRED 0.3504 1.0460 0.738
HELD 1.8475 1.1377 0.105
BNPL RATE -2.9236 15.2394 0.848
BLOSS -4.5945 5.8052 0.429
Number of observation 1889
F-value 3.7500
Prob (F value) 0.0000
R-squared 0.1042
Table 4.  Determinants of relationship closeness
(Dependent variable = DISTANCE)



















Intercept Intercept 117.7945 102.4388 0.250
AUDIT 18.6599 36.3748 0.608
log(BTASSET) -8.0666 ** 3.6910 0.029
AUDIT*log(BTASSET) -0.9875 2.2654 0.663
log(ASSET) 5.8481 *** 1.4616 0.000
CURRENT -0.1091 0.1481 0.461
CAPRATIO -12.8462 ** 6.3985 0.045
PPMARGIN 53.3149 ** 24.6037 0.030
BUILDING -19.9071 13.9139 0.153
MACHINERY -19.4153 17.5931 0.270
VEHICLE 53.6815 46.4878 0.248
TOOL 90.7792 105.0385 0.388
LAND -4.5450 14.4937 0.754
FAGE 0.4754 *** 0.1358 0.000
FAGE2 -0.0016 *** 0.0005 0.004
EMPLOYEE 0.0026 0.0019 0.170
LISTED 30.4991 ** 13.8322 0.028
OWNER 8.8723 ** 4.1907 0.034
GENDER 16.8157 12.1125 0.165
HOUSING 7.8199 5.7607 0.175
EDUCATION -5.4854 4.2818 0.200
AGE -0.2877 0.2073 0.165
CONSTRUCT -8.7499 5.5307 0.114
TRANSPORT -8.0578 12.6777 0.525
WHOLESALE -0.9367 6.6011 0.887
RETAIL -15.0079 * 7.8267 0.055
REALESTATE -3.1288 13.1387 0.812
SERVICE -20.2087 *** 5.7602 0.000
OTHER -21.4988 *** 7.0647 0.002
HOKKAIDO -11.1751 9.4353 0.236
TOHOKU -4.8651 7.7918 0.532
KITAKANTO -13.4503 9.3126 0.149
CHUBU -1.4275 6.7012 0.831
KANSAI -5.1736 6.0202 0.390
CHUGOKU 13.4910 10.5046 0.199
SHIKOKU 15.3806 12.5445 0.220
KYUSYU -0.0431 8.7790 0.996
BTLOANR 50.3394 74.1708 0.497
BLIQUIDITY 15.6914 88.8928 0.860
BCAPR -504.1973 1279.2390 0.694
BCAPR^2 9996.0080 14068.7700 0.477
BBIS -854.6951 ** 344.6993 0.013
BBIS^2 3598.1080 ** 1400.7590 0.010
BROA N 2307.0770 * 1220.8320 0.059
ACQUIRE 17.2936 * 9.2086 0.061
ACQUIRED 9.7373 6.8211 0.154
HELD 4.7760 9.2615 0.606
BNPL RATE -154.1369 139.1466 0.268
BLOSS 41.2167 45.7561 0.368
Number of observation 1908
F-value 2.7000
Prob (F value) 0.0000
R-squared 0.0759
Table 5.  Determinants of relationship closeness
(Dependent variable = CONTACT)



















Intercept Intercept -5.6580 5.1427 0.271
AUDIT -2.0501 ** 1.0305 0.047
log(BTASSET) 0.1214 0.1050 0.248
AUDIT*log(BTASSET) 0.1391 ** 0.0678 0.040
log(ASSET) 0.2337 *** 0.0849 0.006
CURRENT -0.0081 ** 0.0041 0.048
CAPRATIO -1.3222 *** 0.3642 0.000
PPMARGIN -0.3538 1.0498 0.736
BUILDING -0.9269 0.7447 0.213
MACHINERY 0.5463 0.7107 0.442
VEHICLE -3.9949 *** 1.3481 0.003
TOOL 6.2549 7.3395 0.394
LAND 0.9515 0.8718 0.275
FAGE -0.0002 0.0057 0.975
FAGE2 0.0000 0.0000 0.156
EMPLOYEE 0.0018 * 0.0009 0.049
LISTED 1.6931 ** 0.6585 0.010
OWNER -0.4948 ** 0.2209 0.025
GENDER -0.1401 0.3778 0.711
HOUSING 0.3259 0.2480 0.189
EDUCATION -0.0068 0.1779 0.969
AGE 0.0090 0.0092 0.328
CONSTRUCT 0.2035 0.1920 0.289
TRANSPORT 0.0768 0.3780 0.839
WHOLESALE 0.3172 0.2215 0.152
RETAIL 1.0782 0.7643 0.159
REALESTATE 1.5650 *** 0.4937 0.002
SERVICE 0.1414 0.2395 0.555
OTHER 0.8728 ** 0.3743 0.020
HOKKAIDO -0.3339 0.5910 0.572
TOHOKU -0.5403 * 0.3056 0.077
KITAKANTO -0.8406 ** 0.3918 0.032
CHUBU -0.7040 ** 0.2741 0.010
KANSAI -0.1137 0.2717 0.676
CHUGOKU -0.0937 0.3481 0.788
SHIKOKU -0.2036 0.4348 0.640
KYUSYU -0.0038 0.3539 0.992
BTLOANR 6.6699 4.5674 0.144
BLIQUIDITY 2.9970 5.1313 0.559
BCAPR -26.8765 35.6220 0.451
BCAPR^2 278.5441 380.4537 0.464
BBIS 7.5794 10.5952 0.474
BBIS^2 -48.4740 57.2413 0.397
BROA N -2.1353 39.4025 0.957
ACQUIRE -0.4204 0.3489 0.228
ACQUIRED -0.6172 * 0.3648 0.091
HELD 0.9674 0.6132 0.115
BNPL RATE -3.6037 5.0876 0.479
BLOSS -1.0192 2.9090 0.726
Number of observation 1960
F-value 10.8100
Prob (F value) 0.0000
R-squared 0.1691
Table 6.  Determinants of relationship closeness
(Dependent variable = NOBK)
Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or
10% level.
Main
independent
variables
Entrepreneur's
characteristics
Industry dummies
Regional dummies
Firm's financial
numbers
Bank
characteristics
Firm's
characteristics